

**FILE**

**SECRET**  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**

*Include covering instructions to agencies. Get flow to sharpen up statements; indicate priorities; eliminate unknowns.*

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
**OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES**

**4 December 1952**

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)  
Colonel Gerald F. Lillard, USA (G-2)  
Captain Allan L. Reed, USN (ONI)  
Colonel Jack E. Thomas, USAF (AFOIN-2A)  
Captain John A. Holbrook, USN (JIG)

**SUBJECT :** Post-Mortem: NIE-47, "Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Asia Through Mid-1953", published 31 October 1952; NIE-55/1, "Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea", published 30 July 1952; and NIE-58, "Relations Between the Chinese Communist Regime and the USSR: Their Present Character and Probable Future Courses", published 10 September 1952

**REFERENCE :** Procedure for Reducing Intelligence Deficiencies in NIE's, dated 3 June 1952

1. The attached List of Intelligence Deficiencies revealed in the preparation of NIE-47, NIE-55/1, and NIE-58, are submitted for your consideration in accordance with referenced procedure.

2. Please have your representative meet with us at 10:00 Tuesday, December 16, in Room 146 South Building.



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D/Asst. Director/Adm.

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Enclosure A

Distribution "B"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

4 December 1952

ENCLOSURE A

LIST OF INTELLIGENCE DEFICIENCIES REVEALED IN THE PREPARATION  
OF NIE'S 47, 55/1 AND 58

In the preparation of NIE's 47, 55/1, and 58, several intelligence deficiencies were revealed. These deficiencies are of varying importance. For the most part, they are related to three general questions: what are the political and economic effects of the Korean war on Communist China, how do the USSR and Communist China jointly administer and maintain the war effort in Korea, and what is the precise nature of Sino-Soviet political relations?

The following outline specifies the points on which NIE's 47, 55/1, and 58, were weakened by the lack of adequate intelligence. Many of these items have previously been cited in the post mortem on SE-27, some are weaknesses which the IAC agencies are currently in the process of correcting, and certain of the items may be of an "unknowable" nature. We feel, nevertheless, that examination of these weaknesses may reveal new procedures for improving existing intelligence on these questions. The items are not listed in any order of proposed priority, and they are not to be regarded as intelligence requirements for collection purposes.

PRIORITIES

B - A. The Political and Economic Effects of the Korean War on  
Communist China *Attitudes*

1. What has been the effect of the Korean war in Communist *China* on:

- a. Popular support of the regime?
- b. Popular attitudes toward the USSR? US? Japan?  
Chinese Nationalists?
- c. National consciousness ~~and chauvinism~~?
- d. Class structure?
- e. Party structure and discipline?

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2. What has been the effect to date of the Korean war in Communist China on:
  - a. The viability of the economy?
  - b. The rehabilitation and expansion of productive capacity?
  - c. The economic dependence on the USSR? On what terms has Communist China been receiving economic aid from the USSR?

*H.* B. The Sino-Soviet War Effort in Korea

- What role do Soviet advisors play in Chinese Communist military planning?*
- (3) 3. What is the nature of joint Sino-Soviet military direction of the Korean war?

*Illustrative of sharpening up statements.*

4. What is the relation of the Soviet Air Force to the Korean war and the CCAF? What combat experience have CCAF pilots actually had? What degree of combat proficiency have CCAF pilots demonstrated in Korea?
- (1) 5. What is the Sino-Soviet capability to support:
  - (a) intensified hostilities, and (b) a general war in the Far East?
  - a. What is the productive capacity of the Soviet Far East? Of Communist China?
  - b. What are the capabilities of the Soviet supply channels into Asia? The capability of the Trans-Siberian RR and of the Manchurian RR's? Other supply channels?
  - c. What effect would a prolonged and intensified war effort in Korea have upon Communist China's economy?
  - d. What capability does Communist China have to support a prolonged and intensive air offensive in Korea? How large, and where, are Communist China's aviation POL stockpiles?
  - e. Where are Soviet Far East stockpiles located, and what is their level?

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- f. What is the amphibious capability of the Soviet Far East forces, particularly with respect to large unit and combined operations training?
- 6. How important is Communist China's economy in the total Communist economic support of the Korean war?
- 7. On what terms has Communist China been receiving military aid from the USSR?

C. The Nature of Sino-Soviet Political Relations

- 8. What are Communist intentions with respect to an armistice in Korea? Is there any divergence of view, Chinese and Soviet, on this question?
- 9. What influence does the USSR exert in the key centers of the Chinese Communist regime?
  - a. In the regime's security agencies? Army? Party? Government? Economy?
  - b. What key personalities in the regime, if any, may be said to be "Muscovites"?
- 10. What influence (political, economic, and military) does the USSR exert in the border areas of Communist China?
  - a. What is the nature of political relations among Communist China, the USSR, and Mongolia?
  - b. What influence does the USSR (or Mongolia) exert in Manchuria? in Inner Mongolia? in Sinkiang?
- 11. What relations of primary influence exist between Communist China and the USSR?
  - a. In doctrine concerning revolutions in Asia?
  - b. In the strategic direction of Communist activities in Southeast Asia? in Japan?
  - c. In North Korea? To what degree has the presence of Chinese Communist troops affected Soviet influence there?

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12. To what degree, if any, are the Chinese Communists more impatient and aggressive concerning foreign policy ambitions than the Soviets?

D. Other Questions

The following intelligence weaknesses were also revealed in the preparation of NIE's 47, 55/1, and 58:

13. To what degree does public opinion in Communist China condition the regime's determination of policy?
14. What is the state of Communist China's air defenses in Manchuria and north China? Elsewhere in China? To what extent would a redeployment of the CCAF improve these defenses?
15. What trends exist in Communist China's armed force mobilization programs? Are the armed forces growing larger, smaller, or remaining static in their numerical strength?
16. What phasing programs have been set for the modernization of Chinese Communist armed forces with Soviet equipment?